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WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA TO DEFECTIVE
INDICTMENTS
People v. Englese
7 N.Y.2d 83, 163 N.E.2d 869, 195 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1959)
A felony indictment charged the defendant with the offense of carrying
a dangerous weapon in violation of section 1897, subdivision 5, of the New
York Penal Code. The indictment was defective in that it failed to allege
that the defendant had been previously convicted of any crime as required by
that section of the Penal Code in order to obtain a felony conviction. The
defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment and was sentenced thereon. After
serving five years in prison the defendant moved to vacate the conviction
on the grounds that his acts, if proved, would only constitute a misde-
meanor. The trial court granted the motion to vacate the judgment but
refused to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty. The defendant
was then sentenced on a misdemeanor and the Appellate Division affirmed.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and allowed the
defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty to the misdeameanor. 1
The problem posed by this case (but not discussed in the opinion), is
whether a plea of guilty is simply an admission of fact, that is, a confession
in open court, or whether it is an admission of fact in light of a specific
charge. Under English common law when the defendant was confronted
with an indictment, he was forced to either admit the alleged acts or deny
the allegations. 2 Thus Blackstone says: "When a criminal is arraigned, he
either stands mute or confesses the fact, which circumstances we may call
incidents to arraignment."'3 Therefore, when the defendant "confessed to
the facts," his answer was considered as a confession such as to admit all
material facts specified in the indictment.4
In this area of criminal procedure most courts seem to be uncertain
as to the effect of admissions contained in a guilty plea.5 English courts are
not confronted with this uncertainty because the defendant is allowed to
withdraw his plea any time before sentencing.6 Thus, the question as to
1 People v. Englese, 7 N.Y.2d 83, 163 N.E.2d 869, 195 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1959). In
respect to matters reviewable on appeal, the general rule is that a plea of guilty is
the same or has the same effect as a finding of guilty by a jury verdict. Spirow v.
United States, 24 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1928). Thus, it is not mere evidence of guilt as
is an extra-judicial confession, but it is a. conclusive admission of guilt. People v. Brown,
140 Cal. App. 616, 36 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1934).
However, a plea of guilty does not confer jurisdiction or authorize a conviction in
the absence of a valid indictment, but constitutes an admission of what is well alleged
or charged. People v. Brummett, 22 Ill. App. 2d 46, 159 N.E.2d 511 (1959).
2 Blackstone's Commentaries IV, § 323 (1876).
3 Id., § 324.
4 Langston v. United States, 153 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1946). Also, see Littlejohn v.
Hiatt, 197 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1952).
5 People v. Englese, supra note 1.
6 Rex v. Plummer, 2 K.B. 339 (1902); Rex v. Sell, 9 C. & P. 346, 173 Eng. Rep. 863
(1840).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
when a defendant may withdraw his plea to a defective indictment never
arises. This rule has also been followed by a minority of courts in the
United States.7
In general, however, American courts hold that leave to withdraw a
plea of guilty is within the discretion of the trial court.8 It is here that the
question as to the effect of a plea of guilty becomes crucial, since only by
deciding this question can it be determined if there is an abuse of discretion
in refusing to allow one to withdraw his plea. This means that if the in-
dictment was defective in that it failed to inform the defendant of the exact
crime with which he is charged, it would be within the discretion of the
trial court, subject only to review of abuse of discretion, to determine
whether the defendant was prejudiced by the defect, and thus justifying
a withdrawal of his plea.
An analysis of the few cases discussing the point indicates that a plea
of guilty is not merely an admission of the acts of the defendant, but an
admission of certain facts in light of the charges indicated in the indictment.9
There are holdings which indicate that a plea of guilty entered to one charge
will not result in conviction of a greater charge, even though the admitted
facts may so warrant.' 0 Moreover, a plea of guilty to one charge is not
grounds for conviction on a completely different charge."
It would seem, then, that the defendant admits only those facts con-
nected with a specific indictment.' 2 What then are the rights of the defendant
concerning a defective indictment? Is it enough that he not be subjected to
a longer sentence? Although the court in the principle case did not discuss
this problem and, indeed, talked in terms of "abuse of discretion of the
trial court" it correctly saw the problem when it said, "But was he not de-
prived of his fundamental right to plead to the misdemeanor charge? And
could it not be that he pleaded guilty because he was charged with a
felony?"' 3
7 People v. Hollingsworth, 338 Mich. 161, 61 N.W.2d 22 (1953). This rule may
have been modified in People v. Case, 340 Mich. 526, 65 N.W.2d 803 (1954) when the
court said that this was a privilege and not an absolute right. As to the matter of a
right, see Higgins v. State, 92 Ga. App. 739, 90 S.E.2d 40 (1955).
8 LaBarbera v. State, 63 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1953); Reed v. Comm. of Ky., 261 SAV.2d
630 (Ky. 1953); State v. Frohner, 150 Ohio St. 53, 80 N.E.2d 868 (1948); State v.
Rose, 256 P.2d 493 (Wash. 1953).
9 A guilty plea admits only the facts charged in the information, and confesses no
crime, if none is charged therein. People v. LaFace, 148 Misc. 238, 266 N.Y.S. 458
(Westchester County Ct. 1933). The defendant cannot plead guilty except to a
specific indictment, People ex rel. Glass v. Murphy, 284 N.Y.S. 882, 246 App. Div. 885
(1936).
10 Commonwealth v. Roby, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 496 (1832); State v. Dickson, 200
Iowa 17, 202 NA. 225 (1925).
11 A plea of guilty to the offense of permitting gambling on the premises is not an
admission of guilt of setting up and operating a game. Gilley v. Commonwealth, 312
Ky. 585, 229 S.W.2d 60 (1950).
12 People ex rel. Glass v. Murphy, supra note 9.
13 People v. Englese, supra note I at 86, 163 N.E.2d at 878, 195 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
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Under the prevailing rule, Ohio included, 14 leave to withdraw a plea
of guilty is granted or refused at the discretion of the trial court, subject to
review by the appellate court for an abuse of discretion. The justification
for this rule is that the trial judge ordinarily has the better opportunity to
view the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the defendant before
the court. Thus the defendant should not be allowed to trifle with the court
by deliberately entering a plea of guilty one day and then withdrawing it
the next.15 Moreover, from an administrative point of view it is undesirable
to allow a defendant to speculate on his punishment and then withdraw his
plea if he is disappointed. Under this view, it seems that the ruling of the
trial court should be sustained unless it can be shown that a manifest in-
justice will result in a particular case.
Such injustice does result where one is refused his request to withdraw
his plea to an erroneous indictment, especially when the error is a material
one as in the instant case. Appellate courts should, and have considered a
denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty as an abuse of discretion
when there has been, (1) ignorance and inadvertance, 8 (2) a plea not
voluntarily and freely made,"1 or (3) duress in obtaining the confession. 18
In the instant case the prosecution, the accused, and the trial court
were operating under the assumption that the indictment was for a felony.
Where all parties are acting under such a mistake of law, it is only fair that
the defendant be given an opportunity to plead to the correct charge. Denial
of such an opportunity should certainly be considered an abuse of discretion.
In order to guarantee just results, it is essential that courts discuss the exact
effect of admissions incorporated in a guilty plea, that is whether the de-
fendant pleads merely to the facts or to the entire indictment. Such a de-
termination is necessary to guide the trial court in the exercise of its dis-
cretion in this area.
On application by the defendant to change his plea of guilty to a plea
of not guilty, all doubt should be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits.' 9
Perhaps by adopting this view, the courts will be forced to discuss and de-
cide the crucial problem of whether the defendant pleads to facts or to a
specific indictment.
Windell F. Fisher
14 In Ohio, the granting of permission to withdraw a plea of guilty rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court, State v. Frohner, 150 Ohio St. 53, 80 N.E.2d 868
(1948). Moreover, a party should not be permitted to trifle with the court in deliber-
ately entering a plea of guilty one day and capriciously withdrawing it the next day,
In re Spensky, 133 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Ct. App., 1955).
15 In re Spensky, supra note 14.
16 Mahoney v. State, 197 Ind. 335, 149 N.E. 444 (1925).
17 State v. Peterson, 42 Idaho 785, 248 Pac. 12 (1926).
18 People v. Schwarz, 201 Cal. 309, 257 Pac. 71 (1927).
19 State v. McBane, 128 Mont. 369, 275 P.2d 218 (1954).
